Economic Growth, Technical Progress, and Social Capital: the Inverted U Hypothesis by Antoci, Angelo et al.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Economic Growth, Technical Progress,
and Social Capital: the Inverted U
Hypothesis
Angelo Antoci and Fabio Sabatini and Mauro Sodini
European Research Institute on Cooperative and Social Enterprises
(Euricse), Trento
15. April 2011
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/30326/
MPRA Paper No. 30326, posted 24. April 2011 04:52 UTC
Economic Growth, Technical Progress, and Social Capital:  
the Inverted U Hypothesis
1
 
 
Angelo Antoci
2
, Fabio Sabatini
3*
 Mauro Sodini
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We set up a theoretical framework to analyze the possible role of economic growth and 
technical progress in the erosion of social capital. Under certain parameters, the relationship 
between technical progress and social capital can take the shape of an inverted U curve. We 
show the circumstances allowing the economy to follow trajectories where the stock of 
social capital grows endogenously and unboundedly.  
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1. Introduction 
In his best-seller Bowling Alone, Robert Putnam (2000) documents how most indicators of social 
capital have followed an inverted U path in the United States during the twentieth century: during the 
first two-thirds of the century, “Americans took a more and more active role in the social and political 
life of their communities in churches and union halls, in bowling alleys and clubrooms, around 
committee tables and card tables and dinner tables”, and they behaved in an increasingly trustworthy 
way toward one another (2000, p. 183). Then, beginning in the 1960s and 1970s and accelerating in the 
1980s and 1990s, an inexorable erosion of the stock of American social capital started. Apparently, 
year by year Americans became less generous and trustworthy, less engaged in community problems 
and less inclined to meet their friends, neighbours, and acquaintances.  
The author discusses three main explanations for this inverted-U trend: pressures on time and money, 
mobility and sprawl, and technology and mass media. Pressures on time and money, as well as mobility 
and sprawl, have been considered in the economic and sociological literature as channels through 
which economic growth can bring about a side effect of reduced social connectedness (Wellman 2001, 
Routledge and von Amsberg 2003, Hooghe 2003, Glanville 2004, van Ingen and Dekker 2011). An 
early account of the possible mechanism is given by Fred Hirsch (1976) in his book Social Limits to 
Growth: “As the subjective cost of time rises, pressure for specific balancing of personal advantage in 
social relationships will increase ... Perception of the time spent in social relationships as a cost is itself 
a product of privatized affluence. The effect is to whittle down the amount of friendship and social 
contact ... The huge increase in personal mobility in modern economies adds to the problem by making 
sociability more of a public and less of a private good. The more people move, the lower are the 
chances of social contacts being reciprocated directly on a bilateral basis” (p.80). However, as Putnam 
(2000) states, it is difficult to find evidence of an association between economic growth, pressure on 
time and money, and the decline in civic and social engagement experienced in the U.S. The author 
then points to technological progress as a possible reason for the erosion of the American social capital. 
Technology has in fact made news and entertainment increasingly individualized. In Putnam’s words, 
people do not have to coordinate their “tastes and timing with others in order to enjoy the rarest culture 
or the most esoteric information … Electronic technology allows us to consume hand-tailored 
entertainment in private, even utterly alone” (2000, pp. 216-217). Putnam notes that it was throughout 
the 1970s—just as civic and social disengagement was gathering steam in the United States—that the 
time allocation of Americans “massively shifted toward home-based activities (especially watching 
TV) and away from socializing outside the home” (2000, p. 238). The author argues that the rise of 
electronic communications and entertainment has led agents to spend more and more time and money 
on goods and services consumed individually, rather than those consumed collectively.  
In this paper, we develop a dynamic model integrating Putnam’s and Hirsch’s hypotheses, as well as 
other promising hints from the sociological and the economic empirical literature on social capital. The 
main objective of the analysis is to better understand how economic growth and technological progress 
may influence the accumulation of social capital.  
We assume that the well-being of individuals depends on two kinds of goods: material and relational. 
Relational goods are a distinctive type of good that can only be enjoyed if shared with others. They are 
different from private goods, which are enjoyed alone (Uhlaner 1989). A peculiarity of relational goods 
is that it is virtually impossible to separate their production from consumption, since they coincide (Gui 
and Sugden 2005). For example, a football match with friends is enjoyed (consumed) in the very 
moment of its production (i.e. the 90 minutes spent on the sports field). Agents can choose how to 
allocate their time between the two types of production (of private vs. relational goods). Following 
Coleman (1988, 1990), we assume that social participation (i.e. the production/consumption of 
relational goods) incidentally generates social capital as a by-product. Social capital is here defined as 
the sum of durable ties that agents develop through their social participation. Following hints from 
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political science (see for example Hochschild 1997), we assume that on-the-job interactions can 
stimulate the creation of interpersonal ties as well. 
As sustained by Coleman (1988), the stock of social capital functions as a public good, which enters as 
an argument in the agents’ utility functions and as an input in the production of both private and 
relational goods. In this way, we intend to model one of the most debated claims emerging from the 
empirical literature: the positive role of social capital in material production (Knack and Keefer 1997, 
Paldam and Svendsen 2000, Peri 2004, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005, Akçomak and ter Weel 2009, 
Bjørnskov 2010).  
Finally, we assume that private and relational goods can substitute for each other in the satisfaction of 
individual needs. For example, when the social environment is poor, people may be constrained to 
replace human interactions, such as playing football with friends, with private consumption, such as 
staying at home and watching a TV show or playing a virtual match against the computer. However, 
relational goods cannot satisfy primary needs such as food, security, clothing, and shelter. 
The analysis of agents’ time allocation choices accounts for the alternative cases of zero or positive 
Edgeworth substitutability between the two types of good. Under the more realistic assumption of 
positive Edgeworth substitutability, an increase in the stock of social capital can enhance the 
productivity of time spent on social interaction, thereby encouraging the consumption of relational 
goods. This process results in a positive level of participation which in turn creates and strengthens 
durable ties, further increasing the stock of social capital. 
The analysis of dynamics shows that the economy may be attracted by alternative steady states, 
depending on the initial wealth of social capital and on exogenous parameters representing the 
importance of relational goods in well-being and production. The possibility exists for the economy to 
fall in a “social poverty trap”, where agents devote all their time to private activities.  
The introduction of exogenous technical progress in the production function of private goods causes 
interesting changes in social capital’s accumulation dynamics. If there is no Edgeworth substitutability 
between private and relational goods, then the stock of social capital can grow indefinitely along any 
trajectories or alternatively trend to zero depending on the value of the model’s parameters. Its trend 
relative to technological progress can be monotonic (always increasing or decreasing) or can 
experience an initial decline followed by growth, but not vice versa (growth followed by a decline is 
impossible). In case of positive Edgeworth substitutability, social capital may experience growth 
followed by a decline, so that its relationship with technological progress is described by an inverted-U 
shaped curve similar to the trends reported in Putnam’s Bowling Alone. Along this curve, private 
activities infinitely expand at the expense of social interaction, thereby trapping the economy in a 
situation of social poverty. However, also in the context of substitutability, if social capital’s initial 
endowments are high enough, the economy can follow a growth path along which both technological 
progress and social capital grow indefinitely. 
The outline of the paper is as follows. Sections two and three present the model and analyze its 
dynamics. Section four studies the effect of exogenous technical progress on social capital's dynamics. 
The paper ends with a brief discussion of main results. 
 
2. The model 
We consider a population of size  1  constituted by a continuum of individuals. We assume that, in each 
instant of time t , the well-being of the individual ]1,0[∈i  depends on the consumption of two goods: a 
private material good, )(tCi , and a socially provided good, ).(tBi  We assume that )(tBi  is produced 
through the joint action of the time devoted by agent i  to social activities, )(tsi , the average social 
participation  ditsts i )()(
1
0∫= , and the stock of social capital  )(tKs : 
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))(),(),(()( tKtstsFtB sii =      (1) 
 
In other words, since relational goods can be enjoyed only if shared with others, their production 
process depends on others’ social participation and on the stock of networks existing in the surrounding 
environment. As outlined in the introduction, production and consumption of relational goods basically 
coincide. 
The time agent i  does not spend for social participation, )(1 tsi− , is used as input in the production of 
the output )(tYi  of the private good. As suggested by Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005, 2008) and 
Antoci, Sabatini and Sodini (2011), we assume that social capital also plays a role in the production 
process of the private good. In this way, we model the claim raised by many empirical studies that 
socio-cultural traits—often grouped together under the common label of social capital—are a factor 
enhancing the production of material goods (Knack and Keefer 1997, Paldam and Svendsen 2000, Peri 
2004, Beugelsdijk and van Schaik 2005, Akçomak and ter Weel 2009, Bjørnskov 2010). In addition, 
for simplicity, we assume that )()( tYtC ii = , that is )(tYi  cannot be accumulated, and that the 
production process of )(tYi  requires only the inputs )(1 tsi−  and )(tKs : 
 
))(),(1()()( tKtsGtYtC siii −==     (2) 
 
The functions F  and G in (1) and (2) are assumed to be strictly increasing in each argument. Note that, 
in this context,  )(1 tsi−  can be interpreted as the time spent both to produce and to consume  )(tCi . 
The accumulation of social capital is path-dependent: first, it improves the technology of the 
production of relational goods; second, greater social participation taking the form of higher levels of 
relational goods’ production and consumption fosters the consolidation of ties and trust among people, 
thereby increasing the stock of social capital as a by-product. Of course, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that agents engage in social activities for instrumental purposes (for example, to achieve a 
better job). However, following hints from rational choice sociology (Coleman, 1990), we assume that 
most of the time the creation of interpersonal ties does not depend on rational investment decisions. 
Thus, as in Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2005, 2007, 2008), social capital is accumulated as a by-product 
of social participation.  
Moreover, we assume that the process of private goods production exerts a positive spillover on social 
capital’s accumulation. On-the-job interactions can in fact stimulate the creation of durable ties among 
workers. Friendships often start in the workplace, both spontaneously and as a result of precise human 
resources management strategies. In political science, several schools of thought claim that citizens can 
develop their relational and political attitudes at the workplace. Putnam stresses how “professional and 
blue-collars workers alike are putting in long hours together, eating lunch together, travelling together, 
arriving early and staying late ... Work is where the heart is for many solitary souls” (2000, p. 86). 
Even for the minority who live with a spouse and children, argues Hochschild (1997), the workplace 
increasingly serves as a sanctuary from the stresses of marriage, children and housework. Work 
structures are a generator of face-to-face interactions that stimulate the sharing of social norms and the 
creation of interpersonal ties (Goul Andersen and Hoff 2001; Karasek 1976; Peterson 1992: Schur 
2003; Smith 1985). The workplace can thus be considered as a training ground where people may 
improve those communication and organizational abilities which are crucial for the production and 
consumption of relational goods. In other words, such skills can raise the productivity of time spent on 
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social participation
5
.  
Finally, since human relations need care to be preserved, we introduce a positive social capital’s 
depreciation rate to account for their possible cooling over time: 
 
[ ] )()(),()( tKtYtBHtK ss η−=&     (3) 
 
where )(tKs
&  indicates the time derivative of )(tKs , the parameter 0>η  is the depreciation rate of  
)(tKs  , ditBtB i )()(
1
0∫=  and ditYtCtY i )()()(
1
0∫==  are the average production/consumption of the 
socially provided good and the average production/consumption of the private good, respectively. The 
resulting stock is a public resource, which enters as an argument in every agent's utility function due to 
its ability to contribute to the production of both private and relational goods. 
For simplicity, we consider the following specifications for (1),(2),(3): 
 
[ ] )()(1)( tKtstY sii α⋅−=  
 
)()()()(
1
tKtststB sii
γεε ⋅⋅=
−
                (4) 
 
[ ] [ ] )()()()( tKtBtYtK ss ηδβ −⋅=&  
 
where )1,0(∈ε  is the productivity of time spent on social interaction in the individuals’ production 
process of relational goods, and 0,,, >δγβα . 
Note that a positive average social participation 0)( >ts  is essential for the production/consumption of  
)(tBi , that is 0)( =tBi  if 0)( =ts  whatever the values of )(tsi  and )(tKs  are. If no one participates, 
single agents have no possibility to enjoy relational goods, even in the presence of a positive stock of 
social capital. If αγ >  , then the role of social capital is more relevant in the production/consumption 
of relational goods than in the production/consumption of private goods. 
According to (4), )(tB  and )(tY  are both essential factors for the accumulation of social capital, that is 
the stock of social capital  )(tKs  decreases (that is 0)( <tKs& ) if  0)( =tB  or 0)( =tY . 
Finally, we assume that the instantaneous utility function of individual i  is: 
 
[ ] )(ln)(ln)(),( tPbtCtPtCU iiiii +=     (5) 
 
where )(tPi represents the whole of social needs, )(tCi  are the agents’ private needs, and 0>b   
measures the relative importance of social needs in respect to private ones. We assume that private 
goods can satisfy both private and social needs. If the surrounding environment is socially poor, agents 
may choose to replace human interactions with private consumption (e.g. they may play a virtual match 
against the computer instead of meeting friends on a sports field, or chat with unknown and distant 
                                                 
5
 Those who possess well-developed relational skills are likely to find social and political participation less daunting and 
costly (Brady et al. 1995; Burn and Konrad 1987; Elden 1981; Greenberg 1986; Verba et al. 1995). Some authors claim that 
on the job interactions foster the development of democratic attitudes (Paterman 1970; Verba et al. 1995) and active 
political participation (Adman 2008; Greenberg et al. 1996; Mutz and Mondak 2006; Sobel 1993) as well. 
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people through the web instead of talking with neighbours). By contrast, relational goods cannot satisfy 
primary needs such as food, security, clothing and shelter. A useful way to describe this issue is to 
consider the following linear specification:  
 
)()()( tCdtBtP iii ⋅+=      (6) 
 
where the parameter d  measures the degree of Edgeworth substitutability between )(tBi  and )(tCi   
with respect to the production of  )(tPi . If 0=d , then there is no Edgeworth substitutability between 
the two goods. Note that if  0>d  , the mixed partial derivative of  iU  with respect to )(tCi  and  )(tBi   
is strictly negative: 
 
( )
0
2
2
<
+
−=
∂∂
∂
iiii
i
BdC
bd
BC
U
 
  
This means that the lower the value of )(tBi  is, the greater the marginal utility of private consumption  
)(tCi will be. As argued by Antoci, Sacco and Vanin (2007), it is more rewarding to interact with 
people in a context that offers many options for socially enjoyed leisure. On the contrary, if the social 
environment is poor, and people have few chances to meet and enjoy relational goods, private 
consumption is more rewarding. For brevity’s sake, from now the term “substitutability” will mean 
“Edgeworth substitutability”. 
Letting r  be the discounting rate of future utility, the  −i agent’s maximization problem is: 
 
{ } dtetPbtC rtii
tsi
−+∞ +∫ )(ln)(lnmax 0)(     (7) 
 
subject to the dynamic constraint (4). The agent i  solves problem (7) taking as exogenously given the 
value of )(tKs  and the average values )(ts , )(tB  and )(tY  because the choice of )(tsi  by agent i  does 
not modify the average values, being economic agents a continuum. As a consequence, by applying the 
Maximum Principle to problem (6) we obtain that the choices of individual i  do not depend on the co-
state variable associated to )(tKs  (that is the “price” of )(tKs ) in the maximization problem (7). 
Consequently, to solve problem (7), agent i  chooses in each instant t  the value of )(tsi  maximizing 
the value of the instantaneous utility function (5). This implies that the dynamics of )(tKs  we study do 
not represent the social optimum. However, since agent i  plays the best response )(tsi , given the 
others’ choices, the trajectories followed by )(tKs  represent Nash equilibria. In fact, along these 
trajectories, no agent has incentive to modify his choices if the other agents do not revise theirs as well. 
To simplify our analysis, in this paper we focus on symmetric Nash equilibria. In particular, we assume 
that individuals are identical and make the same choices. This assumption allows us to study the 
choices of a representative agent. Thus we can omit the subscript i  in the variables )(tsi , )(tBi , )(tYi  
and )(tCi writing simply )(ts , )(tB , )(tY  and )(tC . In this symmetric Nash equilibrium context, we 
have that ex ante average values )(ts , )(tB  and )(tY  are considered as exogenously given by the 
representative agent. However, once )(ts  is chosen, ex post it holds: 
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)()( tsts =  
 
)()()()()()()()(
1
tKtstKtstKtststB sss
γγγεε ⋅=⋅=⋅⋅=
−
 
 
[ ] [ ] )()(1)()(1)( tKtstKtstY ss αα ⋅−=⋅−=  
 
In this context, the representative agent, in each instant of time t , choses )(ts  solving the following 
static optimization problem: 
 
[ ] [ ]{ }αγεεα sss
s
KsdKssbKs ⋅−⋅++⋅−
−
)1(ln)1(lnmax
1
   (8) 
 
taking as exogenously given the values of  s  and sK . The solution )(ts  of the problem (8) has to be 
substituted to )(ts  in the equation (4) which, under our symmetric Nash equilibria assumption, can be 
written as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ]
[ ][ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] )()()()(1
)()()()()()(1
)()()()(
1
tKtKtsts
tKtKtststKts
tKtBtYtK
ss
sss
ss
η
η
η
γδαβδβ
δ
γεεβα
δβ
−⋅−=
=−⋅⋅⋅⋅−=
=−⋅=
+
−
&
 (9) 
 
where β  and δ  are strictly positive parameters. Note that under dynamics (9), social capital 
accumulation is negative if 0)( =ts  (no social participation) or if  1)( =ts  (the production/consumption 
of the private good is equal to zero). As noted above,  )(tB  and )(tY  are in fact both essential factors 
for the accumulation of social capital. Thus, even if people devote all their time to social participation, 
the stock of social capital is doomed to erosion if there is no private production so that primary needs 
cannot be satisfied. 
According to (9), the value of  )(ts  which, given )(tKs , maximizes the rate of growth of )(tKs  is: 
 
δβ
δ
+
== :)( gsts  
 
The latest expression can be interpreted as the “golden rule” for the accumulation of social capital. 
Note that  0→gs   if  0→δ , and  1→gs  when the value of β  is negligible in relation to that of δ . 
 
3. Analysis of the model 
 
3.1 The time allocation choice 
For simplicity, we limit our analysis to robust cases only, that is those not corresponding to equality 
conditions on parameters’ values. The following result concerns the choice of )(ts  by the 
representative agent  (due to space constraints, propositions’ proofs are omitted if straightforward). 
Lemma 1 Problem (8) admits solution and the time allocation choice )(ts∗  of the representative agent 
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is: 
1) if  0>−αγ    
( )
( )



>
≤
=
−
−
−
−
+
+−+
+−
+
∗
αγ
αγ
αγ
αγ
εε
ε
ε
1
1
)1(
)1()()1(
)1()(
)1(
)( if    ,
)( if                            ,0
)(
b
bd
sbdtKb
bdtKb
b
bd
s
tK
tK
ts
s
s
  (10) 
2) if  0<−αγ    
( )
( )



>
≤
=
−
−
−
−
+
+
+
+
+−+
+−
∗
αγ
αγ
αγ
αγ
ε
εε
ε
1
1
1
)1(
1
)1(
)1()()1(
)1()(
)( if                           ,0
)( if    ,
)(
b
bd
s
b
bd
sbdtKb
bdtKb
tK
tK
ts s
s
  (11) 
 
Social capital produces contrasting pressures on the representative agent’s time allocation choices. 
Remember that γ  and α  are the exponents of sK  in the production functions of )(tB  and )(tY , 
respectively,  0>b  represents the weight of social needs, and d  measures the degree of Edgeworth 
substitutability between  )(tBi  and )(tCi  in the satisfaction of social needs )(tPi . 
If 0>−αγ  then (ceteris paribus) an increase in the stock of social capital sK  has the effect of raising 
the productivity of time spent on social participation )(ts  relative to that of time spent on the 
production and consumption of the private good. In this case, if the stock of social capital is “high” 
enough, then social participation will be positive ( 0)( >ts ). If social capital’s initial endowments are 
“low”, then agents will devote all their time to private production:  despite the improvement in the 
productivity of time devoted to social participation, the agents’ allocation choice will be guided by the 
necessity of meeting private needs )(tCi  first. 
If 0<−αγ , an increase in the stock of social capital sK  raises the productivity of time spent on 
private production more than the productivity of time devoted to social participation. Then, if the initial 
stock of social capital is “high”, agents will prefer to exploit its eventual increases to raise the 
production/consumption of private goods, and we will have 0)( =ts . Otherwise, if the stock of social 
capital is low, individuals will devote time to social interaction leading to a positive level of 
participation. 
An implication of this result is that, according to equation (4), the stock of social capital cannot grow 
indefinitely when .0<−αγ  In this case, an increase in the stock of social capital raises the 
productivity of time spent on private production, therefore leading to a restriction of social 
participation, which in turn hampers the accumulation of social capital in the long run. By contrast, 
when  0>−αγ  , an increase in the stock of social capital can trigger a self-feeding process resulting in 
an increase in the production/consumption of relational goods and the formation and of new ties. 
If there is no substitutability between private consumption C  and the socially provided good B , that is  
0=d  in (5), it holds  0)1( =+bd  ; therefore ( ) 01)1( =−+ αγεbbd   if  0>−αγ . In this context, by (10)-(11), 
the following proposition holds. 
 
Proposition 2 Under the assumption 0=d , problem (8) gives the following time allocation choice  
)(ts∗  of the representative agent:  
;is )( of  valuehewhatever t,
1
)(0 tK
b
b
ts sd ε
ε
+
=∗=  
 
When the two goods are not Edgeworth substitutes in the satisfaction of social needs, the reduction in 
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the production/consumption of relational goods is not accompanied by an increase in the marginal 
utility of private goods. For example, the reduction of opportunities to go to the cinema with friends 
will not raise the marginal utility of devices to watch movies alone. In this case, private goods will not 
replace socially provided goods for the satisfaction of social needs, and participation will be constant, 
such that  0)(1 >> ∗ ts , whatever the value of  )(tKs  is. 
Notice that social participation )(ts∗  in (10)-(11) is (ceteris paribus) a strictly decreasing function of 
the parameter d , which measures the degree of substitutability between B  and C . Therefore, it always 
holds )()( 0 tsts d
∗
=
∗ < . If agents admit the possibility to satisfy social needs (or to compensate for their 
deprivation) through the production/consumption of private goods (e.g. a playstation is considered as a  
perfect substitute of a match played on the tennis field), then the level of social participation will be 
lower, whatever the value of  )(tKs  is. 
 
3.2 Dynamics of social capital accumulation and well-being analysis 
Even if we have considered very simple specifications of functions F , G  and H , there may exist 
multiple steady states and poverty traps. 
The following result concerns the evolution of representative agents’ well-being along the trajectories 
under dynamics (9). 
 
Proposition 3. Along the trajectories of (9), the values of the utility function U and of 
sK  are positively 
correlated. This implies that if there exist two steady states 1sK  and 
2
sK  such that 
12
ss KK >  , then 
2
sK   
Pareto-dominates 1sK ; that is 
1
sK  is a poverty trap. 
The following proposition defines social capital dynamics resulting from the time allocation choices of 
the representative agent described in Proposition (1). 
 
Proposition 4. If  0>−αγ , social capital dynamics are given by:  
 
[ ] [ ]



−⋅⋅
−
= +
+−+
+−
+−+
⋅
−
−
−
−
ssbdKb
bdKb
bdKb
K
s
s
KK
K
K
s
s
s
s η
η
γδαβ
δ
ε
εβ
ε αγ
αγ
αγ
αγ
)1()1(
)1(
)1()1(
 (12) 
 
for, respectively, ( ) αγε −+≤
1
)1(
b
bd
sK   and ( ) αγε −+>
1
)1(
b
bd
sK  . 
If  0<−αγ  , they are given by:  
[ ] [ ]




−
−⋅⋅=
+
+−+
+−
+−+
⋅
−
−
−
−
s
ssbdKb
bdKb
bdKb
K
s
K
KK
K s
s
s
s
η
ηγδαβ
δ
ε
εβ
ε αγ
αγ
αγ
αγ
)1()1(
)1(
)1()1(  (13) 
 
for, respectively, ( ) αγε −++≤
1
1
)1(
b
bd
sK   and ( ) αγε −++>
1
1
)1(
b
bd
sK  . 
Notice that if  0=d  (that is, if relational and private goods are not substitutes), the dynamics of social 
capital accumulation become: 
 
sss KK
b
b
K η
ε
ε γδαβ
δβ
δ
−⋅
+
= +
+
⋅
)1(
)(
    (14) 
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and the corresponding dynamic regimes are described by the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 5. Under the assumption of no Edgworth substitutability ( 0=d ), the basic features of 
dynamics are the following (whatever the sign of the expression αγ −  is): 
a) If  1<+ γδαβ  , there exist two steady states:  
0 and 
)(
)1(
1
1
=




 +
=
−++
ss K
b
b
K
γδαβ
δ
δβ
ε
εη
 
 The economy approaches  sK  (the steady state  0=sK   is repulsive) whatever the initial value of  
0>sK   is. 
b) If  1=+ γδαβ , then the steady state 0=sK  is the unique steady state. In particular, 
    b.1) if  ηδβ
δ
ε
ε <++ )1(
)(
b
b
, the economy reaches the steady state  0=sK ;  
    b.2) if  ηδβ
δ
ε
ε >++ )1(
)(
b
b
, the economy follows a trajectory along which the value of sK  grows indefinitely 
(that is +∞→sK  ) at the constant rate  ηδβ
δ
ε
ε −++ )1(
)(
b
b
. 
 
If private goods cannot substitute relational ones in the satisfaction of social needs, then the economy 
can follow a virtuous trajectory where the stock of social capital unboundedly grows, raising social 
participation and consolidating interpersonal ties. When there is some degree of substitutability 
between  C  and B , that is 0>d , dynamics become more complicated and are characterized by the 
following propositions. 
 
Proposition 6. Under the assumption of substitutability 0>d  and if 0>−αγ , the dynamics are 
characterized by the following properties: 
1) The steady state 0=sK  is always locally attractive (whatever the value of the expression  γδαβ +   
is). 
2) If 1<+ γδαβ   then the number of steady states with 0>sK  is (generically) zero (see Figure 1) or 
two (see Figure 2); if two steady states 1
sK  and 
2
sK  ( 
21
ss KK <  ) exist, then 
2
sK  is attractive while  
1
sK  is repulsive. 
3) If 1=+ γδαβ  then there exists at least a steady state with 0>sK ; furthermore, the number of 
steady states with 0>sK  is one (see Figure 3) or three; if an unique steady state exists, then it is 
repulsive; if three steady states 1sK  , 
2
sK  and 
3
sK  ( 
321
sss KKK <<  ) exist, then  
2
sK  is attractive 
while 1sK  and 
3
sK  are repulsive. Finally, if  ηδβ
δ
ε
ε >++ )1(
)(
b
b
 and the initial value of sK  is greater than  
∗
sK , where 
∗
sK  is the steady state with the highest value of  sK , then there exists an unbounded 
endogenous growth path with increasing well-being along which  ε
ε
b
bs +→ 1  . 
 
If agents tend to replace relational goods with private ones for the satisfaction of social needs (or to 
compensate for the deprivation of human interactions), and if an increase in the stock of social capital  
sK  has the effect of raising the productivity of time spent on social participation )(ts  relative to that of 
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time spent on the production and consumption of the private good, then a steady state where 0=sK  is 
always locally attractive:  an erosion of the entire stock of social capital is possible.  
Under the assumption of substitutability ( 0>d ) and if 0<−αγ , the dynamics are characterized by 
the following properties: 
 
Proposition 7. 
1) The value of  sK  always approaches a steady state value lower than the upper bound  ( ) αγε −++
1
1
)1(
b
bd
  
(see proposition 4), whatever the value of the expression γδαβ +   is. Consequently, the stock of 
social capital sK  cannot grow indefinitely. 
2) If 1<+ γδαβ , then the steady state 0=sK  is always repulsive; there exists at least a steady state 
with  0>sK ; the number of steady states with 0>sK  is (generically) one (see Figure 4) or three; 
steady states with an odd index are attractive and those with an even index are repulsive. Whatever 
the initial value of  sK   is, the economy approaches a steady state with  0>sK . 
3) If 1=+ γδαβ , then the steady state 0=sK  is always locally attractive; the number of steady states 
with 0>sK   is zero (see Figure 5) or two (see Figure 6); the steady states with an odd index are 
repulsive and those with an even index are attractive6. 
 
High initial endowments are a necessary but insufficient condition for an endogenous and unbounded 
growth of the stock of social capital. Necessary and sufficient conditions are as follows: 
 
1
)1(
)(
0
=+
>
+
>−
+
γδαβ
η
ε
ε
αγ
δβ
δ
b
b
 
When these conditions hold, the poverty trap 0=sK  is always locally attractive. However, when the 
initial value of  
sK  is high enough, the economy follows a trajectory along which +∞→sK . As stated 
above, along this trajectory we have that: 
 
ε
ε
b
b
s
+
→
1
 
 
and the equation (12) tends (for +∞→sK ) to the equation: 
 
                                                 
6
 Values of parameters in Figure 4: 9.0=α , 5.0=β , 4.0=γ , ,1=δ 7.0=ε  ,  04.0=η  ,  4=b  ,  ;05.0=d   Figure 5:  
9.0=α ,  8.0=β , 4.0=γ ,  ,1=δ 7.0=ε , 24.0=η ,  4=b ,  ;05.0=d   Figure 6: 9.0=α , 8.0=β ,  38.0=γ ,  ,1=δ  
5.0=ε , 12.0=η , 4=b , .4.0=d  For  9.0=α ,  5.0=β ,  ,55.0=δ  1=γ , 5.0=ε ,  11.0=η ,  4=b , 05.0=d  we 
obtain three positive fixed points of coordinates  27.1=∗sK  (attractive),  41.1=
∗∗
sK  (repulsive),  52.1=
∗∗∗
sK   (attractive). 
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K η
ε
ε
δβ
δ
−⋅
+
=
+
⋅
)1(
)(
 
 
which coincides with the equation (14) describing social capital dynamics under the assumption 0=d   
(no substitutability between C  and B ). This allows us to say that when the stock of social capital 
becomes “high enough”, then the dynamics under the assumption 0=d  and those under the 
assumption 0>d  become very similar. This result is more likely if b  and )1,0(∈ε  exhibit high values 
and if the social capital’s depreciation rate η  is low. As pointed out above, b  measures the weight of 
social needs in determining agents’ satisfaction. A high value of b  indicates that agents are not so 
prone to sacrifice their relational sphere for private needs. Such parameters may be determined by 
cultural factors acknowledging the importance of non-market relations in respect to material 
consumption. For example, a culture exalting the prominence of cooperation and solidarity in social life 
is a good starting point. ε  represents the productivity of social participation in the individual 
production of relational goods. A high value of this parameter indicates that agents are more capable of 
influencing their relational sphere with their own efforts, independent of others’ current levels of social 
participation and of the stock of social capital. This ability may be due to human and social factors. As 
regards human factors, it is remarkable that people have diverse attitudes towards social interactions. 
Charismatic agents may be able to carry away other people in interpersonal relationships even if the 
surrounding environment is not particularly rich of social participation opportunities. It is noteworthy 
that sociological studies claim that charismatic agents behaving as leaders in social networks may act 
as catalysts for the creation of social capital (Burt 1999; Renshon 2000; Roch 2005). However, 
aggregative behaviours need a certain degree of generalized trust to take place. In a socially poor 
environment, agents may use their relational skills to produce relational goods, and to carry away other 
people in social participation, only if there is a reasonable likelihood that their effort will not be wasted 
and will be repaid. The diffusion of social norms of reciprocity is thus a crucial precondition for these 
aggregative and pro-social behaviours. It is noteworthy that, starting from Coleman (1987, 1988), part 
of the literature considers norms of trust and reciprocity as integral parts of the definition of social 
capital. Following such an approach, it is possible to argue that the parameter  ε   incorporates human 
and social factors whose development in the long run is influenced by the stock of social capital. 
The following six figures show Solow-like graphs where the intersection points between [ ])(),( tYtBH  
and )(tKsη  are fixed points of the differential equation. The black dot is used for attractive stationary 
points, the grey dot for repulsive stationary points
7
. 
 
                                                 
7
 Values of simulations in Figure 1: 01.0=α , 4.0=β ,  82.0=γ ,  ,1=δ 12.0=ε , 15.0=η , 4=b ,  ;03.0=d   Figure 
2 01.0: =α , 4.0=β , 82.0=γ , ,1=δ 12.0=ε ,  04.0=η ,  4=b , ;03.0=d  Figure 3: 4.0=α , 9.0=β , 64.0=γ ,  
,1=δ  7.0=ε , 0=η .3, 4=b , .3.0=d  For  9.0=α ,  5.0=β ,  55.0=δ , γ =1, 5.0=ε , η  = 0.11,  4=b , 05.0=d   
we obtain three positive fixed point of coordinates 005.0=∗sK  (repulsive), 02.0=
∗∗
sK (attractive),  
93=∗∗∗sK (repulsive). 
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Figure 1 Figure 2
  
 
Figure 3 Figure 4
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Figure 5 Figure 6
  
 
4. The effects of exogenous technical progress 
In the introduction, we briefly reported how, according to Putnam (2000), the main channel leading 
from economic growth to a reduction in social connectedness may be related to technology.  
In this section we study the dynamic effects generated by the introduction of exogenous technical 
progress )(tT  in the production function of the private good: 
 
[ ] )()(1)()( tKtstTtY sα⋅−⋅=      (15) 
 
where the growth rate of T  is assumed to be given by the equation: 
 
)()( tTtT σ=
⋅
       (16) 
 
where σ  is a strictly positive parameter representing the growth rate of  T . In this context, the time 
allocation choice )(ts∗  by the representative agent is described by the following proposition. 
 
Lemma 8. If the production function of the private good is given by (15), then problem (8) admits 
solution and the time allocation choice )(ts∗  of the representative agent is:  
 
If  0>−αγ    
( )
( )



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−
−
−
⋅+⋅
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s
s
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 If  0<−αγ    
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1
1
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1
)()1(
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)()1()(
)( if                                  0
)( if       
)(
b
tTbd
s
b
tTbd
stTbdtKb
tTbdtKb
tK
tK
ts s
s
 (18) 
 
4.1 The case without substitutability between C and B 
If there is no substitutability between private consumption C  and relational goods B (i.e. if 0=d ), 
social participation is constant and strictly positive )1/()( εε bbts +=∗ . In this context, the dynamic of 
social capital’s accumulation is given by the equation: 
 
sss KKT
b
b
K η
ε
ε γδαββ
δβ
δ
−⋅
+
= +
+
⋅
)1(
)(
    (19) 
where the evolution of  T  is described by the differential equation (16). Note that 0=
⋅
sK  for 0=sK  
and, if  ,1<+ γδαβ  along the graph of the function: 
 
γδαβ
βγδαβ
δβ
δ
εη
ε −−
−−
⋅





+
=
+
1
1
1
)1(
)(
T
b
b
K s     (20) 
 
which is increasing in .T  Note that it holds 0<
⋅
sK  above the curve (20) and  0>
⋅
sK   below it. 
The basic features of dynamics under the assumption of no substitutability are described by the 
following Proposition. 
 
Proposition 9. Dynamics (19) have the following properties: 
1) If 1<+ γδαβ , then both T  and sK  grow without bound (i.e.  +∞=
+∞→
)(lim tT
t
  and  +∞=
+∞→
)(lim tKs
t
 ) 
along any trajectory starting from a strictly positive initial value of .sK  Among these trajectories, 
there exists a trajectory represented by the equation: 
 
[ ]
γδαβ
βγδαβ
δβ
δ
εγδαβηβσ
εγδαβ
−−
−−
⋅





+−−+
−−
=
+
1
1
1
)1()1(
))(1(
T
b
b
K s  (21) 
 
along which the growth rates of T  and sK   are given by: 
 
.
)1( T
T
K
K
s
s
⋅⋅
−−
=
γδαβ
β
     (22) 
 
where σ=
⋅
TT/  by assumption and  
T
T
K
K
s
s
⋅⋅
>   if and only if  1
1
>−− γδαβ
β
. Along the remaining trajectories, 
the growth rate of sK   approaches the value given in (rates1) as  +∞→t  (see Figure7
8
). 
2) If 1=+ γδαβ , then an explicit solution of (19) can be calculated: 
                                                 
8
 Values of parameters:  3.0=α ,  21.0=β ,  2.0=γ ,  ,4.0=δ   4.0=ε ,  02.0=η ,  ,4.0=σ   .1.0=b   
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βσ
β
βσ
βσηβσβ
)]0([
)]0([
)0(
)(
TA
tteTA
e
eK
tK ss ⋅
−⋅
=  
 where  δβ
δ
ε
ε
++
=
)1(
)(
b
b
A   and  )0(sK   and  )0(T   are the initial conditions on social capital and technology 
(see Figure 8
9
). 
 
Proof. The first part of Proposition can be proved by defining a new variable: 
 
)(1
: γδαβ
β
+−
=
sK
T
x       (23) 
 
and by calculating its time derivative: 
 
=+−−=
⋅⋅
+−
⋅
)))(1((
)(1
s
s
s K
K
T
T
K
T
x γδαββγδαβ
β
   (24) 
 
[ ] 





−−
+
−−−+= + xb
b
x )1(
)1(
)(
)1( γδαβ
ε
ε
γδαβηβσ δβ
δ
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Equation (25) has two stationary states: 
 
[ ]
δ
δβ
εγδαβ
εγδαβηβσ
))(1(
)1()1(
 and 0
b
b
xx
−−
+−−+
==
+
∗∗∗  
 
Notice that, since  1<+ γδαβ  , then  0>∗∗x  is globally attractive in the positive x -axis; since, by 
(24), 0=
⋅
x  if and only if (22), point 1) of Proposition is proved. The second part follows by a direct 
calculation. 
It is interesting to note that: 
1) If there is no substitutability between C  and B , then sK  can grow indefinitely, whatever the sign 
of the expression αγ −  is (we will show later that this result no longer hold when there is 
substitutability). 
2) Along the trajectories under dynamics (19), the evolution of 
sK  is monotonic (always increasing or 
decreasing) or follows a U-shaped path, according to which 
sK  is initially decreasing and then 
becomes definitively increasing. It is worthwhile to stress this result in that, as we will see, if there 
is substitutability between C  and B , then the evolution of sK  can take the shape of an inverted U 
                                                 
9
 Time-evolution of  .sK  Values of parameters: 3.0=α ,  9.0=β , 73.0=γ ,  ,1=δ  4.0=ε , 18.0=η , ,9.0=σ    
.1.0=b   Initial condition:  ,3)0( =sK  .02.0)0( =T   
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curve. 
 
Figure 7 Figure 8
 
 
4.2 The case with substitutability between C and B 
If 0>d , then social participation ∗s  depends on the values of  T  and sK  and can assume the value 0. 
In particular, the graph of the function: 
 
αγ
ε
−





 +=
1
)1(
b
Tbd
K s           (26) 
 
separates, in the plane ),( sKT , the region where 0=
∗s   (below the curve) from that where 0>∗s   
(above it). Note that the function (26) is increasing (decreasing) in T  if 0>−αγ  (respectively, if  
0<−αγ  ). 
In the region where 0=∗s , social capital dynamics are given by 0<−=
⋅
ss KK η  and the slope of 
trajectories  
T
K
dT
dK ss
σ
η−=  is negative; this implies that along the trajectories below the curve (26), T  
increases and 
sK  decreases. 
Above the curve (26), social capital dynamics are given by: 
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s
s
s
s
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TbdKb
TbdKb
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K η
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ε
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γδαββ
δ
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αγβ
αγ
αγ
−⋅





+−+
+−
⋅





+−+
= +
−
−
−
−⋅
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  (27) 
 
where T  evolves according to the differential equation (16). 
The basic features of dynamics (27) are described in the following Proposition. 
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Proposition 10. If  0>−αγ  , then the region under the curve (26) is positively invariant under 
dynamics: every trajectory entering this region cannot leave it. Along the trajectories under the curve 
(26), the value of  sK   approaches 0 for  +∞→t   (see Figure 9). 
If 0<−αγ , then the region above (under) the curve (26) is positively invariant if 1)(/ ≥− γαησ   
(respectively, if  1)(/ <− γαησ  ); in any case, along every trajectory the value of sK  approaches 0 for  
+∞→t  (see Figure10 10 and 11 ). 
 
Proof. To check the results on positive invariance of the sets under or above the curve (26), we simply 
have to compare the slope of the trajectories  
T
K
dT
dK ss
σ
η−=  , evaluated along the curve (26), and the slope 
of (26). To prove the results about the evolution of sK , notice that in the set where 0=
∗s  it holds  
sdt
dK
Ks η−=  and consequently tss eKtK
η−⋅= )0()( , where )0(sK  is the initial value of sK . Finally, note 
that in case 0<−αγ , every trajectory lies definitively in the set under the curve (26) or in the set 
above it; in any case, since  +∞→T  , the value of  sK  approaches 0. 
Whatever the sign of the expression αγ −   is, along the trajectories crossing the curve (26) we will 
show that the evolution of sK  can take an inverted U-shape, different from the case without 
substitutability. 
According to the above Proposition, a necessary condition to have unbounded growth of sK  is  
0>−αγ ; that is, the importance of  sK  as an input in the production process of the private good 
(measured by α ) must be lower than its importance in the production process of the relational good 
(measured by γ ). 
To analyze the behaviour of  sK  in case 0>−αγ  we introduce the following definition. 
 
Definition. A Regular Growth Curve (RGC) is a curve in the plane  ),( sKT  along which the rate of 
growth of  T   is equal to the exogenously given value  σ   while the rate of growth of  sK   is equal to a 
constant strictly positive value  g  , possibly different from  σ  . 
Notice that along a RGC, being  σ=
⋅
T
T   and  g
s
s
K
K =
⋅
 , it holds  
T
gK
T
K
dT
dK sss
σ== ⋅
⋅
 ; consequently a RGC is 
the graph of a function  ( ) σ
g
CTTK s = , where C is a positive arbitrary constant. RGCs are not 
trajectories under our dynamics. However, we aim to show that, for  T   high enough, there exist values 
of  g   and  C  , that we will denote by  g   and  C   respectively, such that the corresponding RGC  
( ) σ
g
TCTK s =   is asymptotically approached, for  +∞→T , by the trajectories starting “near” it. This 
implies that along such trajectories  g
s
s
K
K →
⋅
  as  +∞→t . 
Notice that, for  T  high enough, a RGC can be approached by the trajectories only if it lies above the 
curve (separatrix); this requires that  g   must satisfy the necessary condition:  αγσ −>
1g  , where  11 >−αγ . 
                                                 
10
 Values of parameters in  Figure 9: 7.0=α , 2.0=β , 2.0=γ , ,3.0=δ  4.0=ε , η =0.06,  ,04.0=σ  3=b ,  
3.0=d . Figure 10: α =0.3, 2.0=β , 71.0=γ , 3.0=δ , 4.0=ε , 06.0=η , ,04.0=σ   3=b , .3.0=d   
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That is, it must hold  αγ
σ
−>g   (where  σαγ
σ >− ), so we introduce a further definition. 
 
Definition. A Reachable Regular Growth Curve (RRGC) is a RGC satisfying the condition  
seeg (αγ
σ
−>  Figure   11). 
Looking at (17), it is easy to check that, along a RRGC, the social participation choice ∗s  approaches 
the value  
)1( ε
ε
b
b
+  as  +∞→t . Remember that )1( ε
ε
b
b
+  is the value of social participation in the context 
without substitutability. In other words, if  T  and sK  grow following a RRGC, then for T  and sK   
high enough, social participation is almost equal to the level achieved under the assumption of no 
substitutability. Now the problem is:  are there values of  g  and C  such that the associated RRGC may 
be approached by some trajectories of the dynamics? To solve this problem, we analyze the behaviour 
of the variable: 
 
γδαβ
β
−−
=
1
sK
T
x  
 
previously defined (see (23)) and limit our analysis to the case 01 >−− γδαβ . Remember that in the 
context in which 
)1( ε
ε
b
bs +
∗ =  always (i.e. in the context without substitutability), it holds 0=
⋅
x  (see (24)) 
along the curve (see (21)): 
 
σ
g
TCKs ⋅=  
 
where  [ ][ ] )1
1
)1()1(
))(1( γδαβ
δβ
δ
εγδαβηβσ
εγδαβ −−
++−−+
−−≡
b
b
C  and γδαβ
β
−−≡ 1g . So, if >−− γδαβ
βσ
1 αγ
σ
−  (i.e.  1)(1 >−− αγαβγδ
β
 ), we 
have that, as  +∞→T  , along  σ
g
TCK s ⋅=   the value of  
⋅
x   approaches 0  while 
⋅
x  becomes (see (24)) 
strictly positive (respectively, strictly negative) along the RRGCs corresponding to values of  gg <   
(respectively  gg >  ), with  g   and  C   near enough to  g   and  C  , respectively. This implies that all 
trajectories starting (for  T   high enough) sufficiently near to  σ
g
TCK s ⋅=  approach  
σ
g
TCK s ⋅=   as  
+∞→T . Notice that, by Proposition 3, all trajectories in the plane ),( sKT  can be Pareto-ranked; in 
particular, we have that given two trajectories ( )TK s
~
 and ( )TK sˆ , with ( ) ( )TKTK ss ˆ
~
< , then ( )TK sˆ     
Pareto-dominates ( )TK s
~
 . Furthermore, well-being may be decreasing when the economy follows a 
trajectory along which 0→sK  (see Figures
11
 12, 13, 14). 
 
                                                 
11
 Values of parameters in Figures 12, 13, 14: 7.0=α , 2.0=β , 2.0=γ , ,3.0=δ  4.0=ε , 01.0=η , ,04.0=σ  3=b ,  
.3.0=d   
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Figure 9 Figure 10
Figure 11 Figure 12
Figure 13 Figure 14
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6. Concluding remarks 
Our framework addresses a number of hypotheses drawn from the sociological and political science 
literature that have never jointly been taken into account within a theoretical model. Agents allocate 
their time between labour aimed at the production of private goods and social participation activities. 
Private consumption and relational goods are substitutable: if the environment is poor in participation 
opportunities and social participation is perceived as costly and frustrating, people can disengage from 
relational activities and devote more time and resources to private consumption. Following hints from 
Hochschild (1997) and Putnam (2000), we account for the possibility of positive spillovers from 
private to relational production, due to the ability of on-the-job interactions to stimulate the creation of 
durable ties. Following Coleman (1988, 1990), we assume that most of the time the creation of 
interpersonal ties does not depend on rational investment decisions. Rather, it is an incidental,  
unnecessary by-product of social participation. The resulting stock is a public resource, which enters as 
an argument in an agent’s utility function and as an input in both private and relatonal goods’ 
production functions. The main results of the study can be summarized as follows. 
In the framework without technological progress, an unbounded growth of social capital can be 
observed only in the following two cases: 
a) The case in which private goods and relational goods are not Edgeworth substitutes.  
b) The case in which the two types of goods are Edgeworth substitutes but the relevance of the impact 
exerted by the stock of social capital on the production/consumption process of relational goods is 
greater than that exerted on the production process of private ones (i.e. 0>−αγ ). 
In both cases (a) and (b), social capital dynamics are path-dependent. In a “favourable” configuration 
of the model’s parameters, starting from a high enough initial endowment of social capital, the 
economy follows a virtuous trajectory where the stock of social capital endogenously and unboundedly 
grows, raising social participation and consolidating interpersonal ties. On the other hand, the reverse 
process may be self-feeding as well: if the initial endowment of social capital is low, then the economy 
experiences a simultaneous decline in social participation and social capital, leading to “social poverty 
traps” where the time spent on relational activities becomes more expensive (in terms of opportunity 
cost) and less productive (in terms of relational goods). 
If private and relational goods are substitutes but (b) doesn’t hold (i.e. 0<−αγ  ), then no trajectory 
exists along which social capital grows without bound. 
In the context without technological progress, the evolution of social capital is always monotonic, 
always increasing or decreasing. Introducing exogenous technical progress in the production function 
of private goods leads to interesting modifications in social capital's accumulation dynamics. In this 
context, social capital’s trend relative to technological progress can be non-monotonic. In particular, it 
may experience an initial decline followed by growth, but not vice versa, if relational and private goods 
are not substitutes. Under the assumption of positive substitutability, the stock of social capital may 
exhibit a growth followed by a decline, so that its relationship with technological progress is described 
by an inverted U-shaped curve.  
This result is consistent with the inverted U-shaped trends that several indicators of social participation 
followed in the twentieth century.  
Also under the assumption of exogenous technical progress, there exist trajectories along which social 
capital can grow without bound only in the contexts (a) and (b) described above. The possibility to find 
the path to a sustainable growth of social capital crucially depends on the initial endowment of its 
stock:  an environment rich in participation opportunities, a culture acknowledging the importance of 
non-market relations, and the diffusion of moral norms of reciprocity and cooperation certainly 
constitute a good “starting point”. 
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